From a variant of Kuhn's triangulation we derive a discrete version of the Global Newton Method that yields an epsilon-equilibrium of an N-player game and then sequentially reduces epsilon toward zero to obtain any desired precision or the best precision for any number of iterations.
Introduction
In [7] we describe a basic algorithm that computes an ε-equilibrium of an N -player game for any pre-specified ε > 0, but we do not prove there that the algorithm is effective. In this paper we construct an improved version that sequentially decreases ε to obtain arbitrary precision or to obtain the best precision from a fixed number of iterations. Moreover, we prove that the improved algorithm is effective for games with generic payoffs.
The basic algorithm described in [7] generates automatically the sequence of adjacent simplices of Kuhn's [9] triangulation of the strategy space that approximates the path of the Global Newton Method [1, 3, 4] . We prove in a working paper [6, Appendices C and D] that the basic algorithm is effective and publish a code that implements the algorithm, and in [7] we report extensive computational experience. When moderate precision suffices, the basic algorithm is considerably more efficient than the Global Newton Method because avoiding matrix inversions more than compensates for shorter steps, each accomplished by a single pivot (Gaussian elimination).
The improved algorithm in this paper refines the triangulation sequentially to obtain increasing accuracy. As with the basic version, the improved version generates a onedimensional path in the strategy space, but now the path can potentially continue forever as it repeatedly refines the triangulation to obtain ever increasing accuracy. The code for this version is published in a working paper [8, Appendix B] .
First we describe briefly the basic algorithm in [6, 7] and sketch the improved version that allows arbitrarily accurate approximation of an equilibrium. Subsequent sections develop the theory and implementation of the improved algorithm.
1.1. Sketch of the Basic Algorithm. Each game is described by a (1 + N )-dimensional array G of payoffs from profiles of the N players' pure strategies, i.e. G n (s) is n's payoff if s = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) is the profile of pure strategies chosen by players 1, . . . , N . The algorithm traces a connected 1-dimensional path of ε-equilibria of perturbed games of the form G ⊕ λg.
Here g is a generic array of bonuses for the players' pure strategies and G⊕λg is the game with payoff array (G⊕λg) n (s) = G n (s)+λg n,s n . An ε-equilibrium of G is obtained when the effect of these bonuses is nil because λ = 0. One starts with any λ sufficiently large that G ⊕ λg has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and terminates when λ = 0. The algorithm is a discrete version of the Global Newton Method in [3, 4] in which ε is determined by the diameter δ of Kuhn's triangulation of the strategy space that is used for the computations. The algorithm automatically generates the adjacent simplex of the triangulation from the previous one.
The algorithm is called the 'decomposition algorithm' in [7] because it was initially motivated by a scenario in which each player interacts bilaterally with an auxiliary player called the coordinator, rather than multilaterally with the other players. Its key feature is that at each stage each player responds optimally to a mixture of profiles of players' mixed strategies proposed by the coordinator. The coordinator's objective is to minimize the difference between his proposed profile of strategies for the players and their optimal replies to his proposal. In general this formulation implies that ε-equilibria along the path of the algorithm are solutions to a family of linear complementarity problems parameterized by λ. The algorithm traces a one-dimensional path of solutions to this parameterized family, starting from λ > 0 and ending at λ = 0.
Our implementation assumes that the coordinator's objective is to minimize the Euclidean distance between his proposal and the players' optimal replies to his proposal. Moreover, we use the vertices of Kuhn's [9] triangulation of the space of profiles of players' mixed strategies as the set of proposals that are feasible for the coordinator. The diameter δ of the principal simplices of Kuhn triangulation fixes the value of ε, and generally ε = O(δ). The exact relation between ε and δ depends on the Lipschitz constants associated with the players' payoff functions.
The advantage of using the Euclidean distance for the coordinator's objective, and the vertices of Kuhn's triangulation for his feasible proposals, is that the coordinator's set of optimal replies to the profile of the players' mixed strategies then contains a subset of the Kuhn' s triangulation that contains this profile (and it is sufficient to restrict attention this subset). Thus the support of the coordinator's mixed strategy is the set of these vertices. Figure 1 shows an example of the path of the algorithm, projected onto the simplex of one player's mixtures of three pure strategies. The figure shows the triangulation for δ = 1/5. The set of feasible proposals for this player is the set of vertices of this triangulation. The steps of the algorithm yield the sequence of circled points. At each stage the support of the coordinator's mixed strategy is the set of vertices of the smallest subsimplex that contains the circled point. The path starts in the lower right corner and ends in the boundary subsimplex where the path terminates with an arrow.
1.2. Sketch of the Improved Algorithm. In this paper we dispense with the coordinator and exploit directly the fact that the algorithm follows approximately the path of the Global Newton Method. Our purpose is to extend the theoretical development in [6, Appendix C] to the case that triangulations with all diameters δ = 1/α, α = 1, 2, . . . are allowed. This is accomplished by extending the triangulation to (a subset of) the cone generated by the strategy space Σ. This extension enables the algorithm to compute an equilibrium with arbitrary accuracy, depending on the value of α at which one terminates the calculations.
One starts by using the algorithm in [7] with a relatively small scale factor, say α 1 1, to obtain an initial approximate equilibrium when λ reaches zero. The algorithm then proceeds through a sequence of values of α until the desired accuracy of the approximation is obtained. The sequence is not monotonic because the values of α can decrease. Whenever the path returns to α 1 one initially increases λ from zero until it returns to zero, whereupon one again increases α from α 1 . Thus, the path generates a sequence of ε-equilibria of G ⊕ λg, where ε = O(1/α), along which either α = α 1 and λ 0, or α > α 1 and λ = 0. One can terminate the computations at any level of α, provided λ = 0, and thereby obtain an ε-equilibrium where ε = O(1/α), or continue indefinitely to obtain increasingly accurate approximations of a Nash equilibrium as α ↑ ∞. Figure 2 illustrates a possible path of the algorithm for the case of a 1-dimensional strategy space, as well as other paths that are loops or are inaccessible from (α, λ) = (α 1 , ∞). Figure  3 illustrates the form of the increasingly refined triangulations of a one-dimensional strategy space for α = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. As emphasized by van der Laan and Talman [10] , one can accelerate refinements of Kuhn's triangulation by incrementing α by more than 1, but for simplicity here we consider only increments of size ∆α = 1, except in Appendix A.
Although one can start with α 1 = 1, the algorithm can then be slow because there are so many approximate equilibria at this level that the algorithm can return many times to α 1 = 1 before finally reaching an approximate equilibrium at this level that thereafter allows α ↑ ∞. Hence our computational experience suggests that it is better to start with a moderately large value of α 1 .
Strategy Space
Rescaled Strategy Space with integer vertices of the triangulation The following sections develop the triangulation and the resulting algorithm that allows increasing accuracy. The exposition is self-contained and does not require prior familiarity with [6, 7] . Section 2 establishes notation. Section 3 defines a 'pseudo-equilibrium' with the property that a proposal has positive probability only if its support is confined to players' optimal replies to that proposal. Section 4 then derives a triangulation of a subset of the convex cone spanned by Σ for which the vertices are the integer points. Section 5 analyzes the structure of pseudo-equilibria whose support is the set of vertices of a simplex of the triangulation. Section 6 shows that the results of Section 5 yield ε-equilibria as well as a discrete version of the Global Newton Method in which ε can be made arbitrarily small by continuing the path sufficiently far. Finally, Section 7 provides a summary statement of the algorithm. Appendix A summarizes the steps that automatically generate from any given principal simplex of the triangulation the adjacent ones, the faces of the given one, and those of which the given one is a face. Appendix B of the working paper version provides a complete implementation in the APL language.
2. Preliminaries 2.1. Players and Strategies. The set of players is N = { 1, . . . , N }. Each player n ∈ N has a finite set S n of pure strategies. His set of mixed strategies is Σ n = ∆(S n ). Define the product sets S ≡ n S n and Σ ≡ n Σ n of profiles of pure and mixed strategies, and for each n, define
The only subsets of S considered here are product subsets T = n T n , where each T n ⊂ S n .
For each such subset T , denote by Σ(T ) the corresponding face of Σ, and let d T − 1 be the dimension of Σ(T ). For the algorithm we represent a player's mixed strategy equivalently as a point σ n ∈ Σ n or any nonzero point µ n σ n , where µ n > 0, in the cone spanned by Σ n . Similarly, a profile of mixed strategies is such a point in the cone spanned by Σ. Also, for ease in exposition we label the pure strategies of all players as consecutive positive integers. Specifically, each strategy set S n is given as { i 
those pure strategies that are last in the ordering of each T n .
Throughout, α 1 is a fixed positive integer whose role is described in Section 1. . For any nonempty subset T of S, let e T ≡ i∈I(T ) e i , and specify e ∅ = 0.
Let P be the set of points in X whose coordinates are all integers and define P(T ) ≡ P ∩ X(T ). In the following, P is the set of feasible proposals to the players, and later it is the set of vertices of the triangulation.
2.2.
Payoffs and Equilibrium Strategies. Given the sets of players and their strategies, a game G is specified by a payoff function for each player, i.e. a game is specified as a point
of players' payoffs from profiles of pure strategies. Given a game G, let G n (s) denote player n's payoff from the pure strategy profile s ∈ S, and write G n (σ) for n's expected payoff from the profile σ ∈ Σ of mixed strategies. The payoff function G n has an extension to the whole of R I + that we still denote by G n . Specifically, if σ ∈ Σ and µ ∈ R N with µ > 0 then
+ ε for all σ n ∈ Σ n for each player n ∈ N . A 0-equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
Pseudo-Equilibria
This section defines a 'pseudo-equilibrium' with the property that a proposal has positive probability only if its support is confined to players' optimal replies to that proposal. And, we show that a restricted class of pseudo-equilibria yield ε-equilibria.
LetΣ 0 be the set of probability distributions over P with finite support. For each σ 0 inΣ 0 , let P(σ 0 ) be the support of σ 0 . Given a game G, define for each n the functioñ
using the extension of G n to R I + ; then, extend the function toΣ 0 ×Σ n by linear interpolation. The interpretation is that p is a proposed profile of players' mixed strategies, andG n (p, σ n ) is n's expected payoff if his mixed strategy is σ n and all other players use the proposed mixed strategies in p −n . Similarly, a distribution σ 0 ∈Σ 0 is a mixture of proposals.
Definition 3.1 (Inferior Reply). A pure strategy i ∈ S n is an inferior reply for player n
Definition 3.2 (Pseudo-Equilibrium). A mixed proposal σ 0 ∈Σ 0 is a pseudo-equilibrium of G if p i = 0 for each proposal p ∈ P(σ 0 ) and each pure strategy i ∈ S n that is an inferior reply for player n against σ 0 .
That is, analogous to a Nash equilibrium, if p is a proposal to which σ 0 assigns positive probability then p assigns positive probability only to pure strategies that are not inferior replies.
We now show the relationship between certain pseudo-equilibria of G and the equilibria of
Proof. Fix p in the support of σ 0 . Let τ n ∈ Σ n be an arbitrary strategy for some player n and let τ be the profile (
Since σ 0 is a pseudo-equilibrium, it follows that
Next, our assumptions and the Lipschitz property of G n imply that if σ is either σ(p) or τ then
Therefore,
One implication of the above theorem is the following-cf. Theorem 6.2 below. For p in the support of a pseudo-equilibrium σ 0 ,p
p is an approximate equilibrium if: (i) the norm of p is large; and (ii) for each p in the support of σ 0 , |p i − p i | 1 for each coordinate i. In the next section we construct a subset ofΣ 0 such that pseudo-equilibria in this subset have these two properties.
The Triangulation
This section describes a subset Σ 0 ofΣ 0 that suffices for computing equilibria. First we construct a triangulation of X with P as its vertex set. Then we obtain Σ 0 as the subset ofΣ 0 consisting of those distributions whose support is included in the vertex set of some simplex of this triangulation. This triangulation is derived from Kuhn's [9] triangulation of a cube. Appendix A describes a convenient representation of the triangulation and the procedure for moving from a given simplex to any one that is adjacent.
For each x ∈ X, define z(x) ∈ R I by z i (x) = i * n−1 <j i x j for each i ∈ S n and n ∈ N . In other words, z(x) is a representation of x as a profile of "cumulative distributions." Let
for all n, m ∈ N . We first describe a triangulation of Z with V as the vertex set. The triangulation that it implies for X is then derived from the fact that the map
is a linear homeomorphism between X and Z. The following lemma is the basis for the triangulation of Z. 
which yields a decomposition that is obviously unique. A simplex of D is called a principal simplex if it is not a face of another simplex-or equivalently if it has a nonempty interior in Z. There exists a simple characterization of the principal simplices in D:
Proof. Observe first that the principal simplices are those that have d + 1 vertices, since Z is d-dimensional. Therefore, any simplex whose vertices are generated by an ordering as in the lemma is clearly a principal simplex. To prove the reverse, suppose that D is a principal simplex with vertex set v Having triangulated Z we now show the properties of the triangulation, call it P, that it implies for X. It turns out to be easier to characterize the principal simplices in P than to characterize any arbitrary simplex of P directly (which is the main reason for first studying Z). Suppose a principal simplex D of Z is obtained by an ordering π and a vertex v 
and it equals e π(l) − e π(l)+1 otherwise. We therefore have the following theorem, whose proof is obvious.
Theorem 4.4. A simplex P is a principal simplex of P iff there exists an ordering
Every principal simplex in P thus has a compact representation in the form of a vertexordering pair (p 0 , π). A maximal proper face of a principal simplex P in P is not a face of another principal simplex if it is contained in the boundary of X; otherwise it is a face of exactly one other principal simplex. Appendix A provides simple procedures for moving from one principal simplex to an adjacent one, or to faces.
For each T ⊆ S the triangulation P induces a triangulation P(T ) of X(T ) that we now study. Again we first study the equivalent problem for Z. Let Z(T ) be the set of z(x) such that x ∈ X(T ). More directly, Z(T ) is the set of z ∈ Z such that for each n and i / ∈ T n :
be the set of simplices of D whose vertices belong to V (T ). Then D(T ) is a triangulation of X(T ).
There exists a simple characterization of the principal simplices of D(T ) analogous to that of the principal simplices of D. For each n and i 
In the above lemma if p 
The following theorem follows readily from the previous lemma. (T ) for some T , then Q is a subset of at most two different elements of P * (T ); and it is a subset of exactly one element P of P * (T ) iff it belongs to the boundary of X(T ), i.e. Q ∈ P * (I(T )\i) for some i ∈ I(T ), or Q is a subset of Y . If Q belongs to two different P, P ∈ P * (T ), we use P ∧ P to denote Q. If Q ∈ P * (I(T )\i) and is a maximal proper face of P ∈ P * (T ), then we write P as Q ∨ i.
For each P ∈ P(T ), let P 1 be the (possibly empty) face of P that is contained in Y . It is easy to check that the collection of simplices of the form P 1 triangulate Y , and that for each T , the principal simplices of Y under this triangulation are the sets that are maximal faces of the principal simplices of P(T ). Let Q 1 (T ) be the collection of the principal simplices of Y (T ): for a principal simplex P ∈ P * (T ), P 1 belongs to Q 1 (T ) iff P 1 is a maximal face of P .
that their intersection is a maximal proper face of each, let Q 1 ∧ 1Q1 denote this intersection.
For each P ∈ P * (resp. Q ∈ Q * ), let Σ 0 (P ) (resp. Σ 0 (Q)) be the set of mixed strategies of the coordinator whose support is a subset of the vertex set of P (resp. Q). Let Σ 0 be the union over P ∈ P * of the sets Σ 0 (P ). Then Σ 0 is a simplicial complex that shares the properties of X. In fact, let h : Σ 0 → X be the map that sends each vertex in Σ 0 to the corresponding point in X and maps all other points by linear interpolation. Then h defines a triangulation of X.
The Structure of Pseudo-Equilibria
Recall from the previous section that Σ 0 is the subset ofΣ 0 consisting of distributions whose support is a subset of the vertex set of some P ∈ P * . Our objective here is to choose a generic subset of the space G of games such that for each game G in this set its pseudo-equilibria in Σ 0 form a non-degenerate set.
In this section and the next, g ∈ R
I
is a fixed vector. For each game G ∈ G and each λ ∈ R, define the game G ⊕ λg as follows: The payoff to player n from the profile σ is
Observe that if the support of σ 0 is a subset of the vertex set of a simplex in P 1 then against σ 0 the payoff to n from i ∈ S n isG n (σ 0 , i) + λg i . Let P ∈ P(T ) be a simplex of the triangulation whose vertex set is generated by a pair (p 0 , π T ) for some T . Recall that P 1 is the face of P that is contained in Y . In case P 1 is nonempty, there exists 0
Viewing strategies in Σ 0 (P ) as points in R P (not R P ) consider now the following system of equations and inequalities in the variables (G, λ, σ 0 
Let Θ(P ) be the set of solutions to this system and denote by proj the natural projection from Θ(P ) to G. The complementary slackness condition ψ ⊥ in the above system implies that every point in Θ(P ) satisfies at least one of the following: either λ = 0 or σ 0,l = 0 for all l > l 1 . In other words, if (G, λ, σ 0 , v) ∈ Θ(P ) then the support of σ 0 is in P 1 unless λ = 0. The following lemma analyzes the system ψ.
Lemma 5.1. There exists a lower-dimensional closed subset G P of G such that for each G / ∈ G P , and each l 1, the set of points in proj , proving thereby that Θ l (P ) is a manifold of dimension N |S| + 2 − l. To prove that the Jacobian of ψ has full rank, observe that for each (n, i) ∈ J, and coordinate ψ j of ψ, ∂ψ j /∂G n (i, s −n ) = 0 for all s −n ∈ S −n if j = (n, i), while s −n ∂ψ n,i /∂G n (i, s −n ) > 0. Thus, the derivative of ψ n,i is independent of the derivatives of ψ j for all j = (n, i). Since k σ 0,k = 1, there exists some k such that (0, k) / ∈ J. Therefore, the derivatives of ψ 0, * and ψ 0,k for (0, k) ∈ J are independent as well. Finally, the derivative of ψ λ if λ ∈ J is obviously independent of the other derivatives as well. Thus the derivative of ψ has full rank and Θ 
is an open subset of the semialgebraic manifold Θ l (P ) and hence has dimension N |S| + 2 − l. Therefore F C , and hence also proj
(In particular, since all sets are semi-algebraic, proj
(P ) is finite.) Let G P be the union of the sets G l P for l 1. All the properties of the lemma hold for G / ∈ G P .
For a game G, let θ 0 (G, P ) be the set of points (0, σ 0 ) such that there exists v for which (G, 0, σ 0 , v) is in Θ(P ). Since P is a principal simplex in P(T ), for each n and i ∈ S n the i-th coordinate of each vertex p of P is zero if i / ∈ T n . Therefore, σ 0 is a pseudo-equilibrium of G if (0, σ 0 ) belongs to θ 0 (G, P ). (The converse is true if, in addition, the support of σ 0 contains for each i ∈ I(T ) a vertex p such that p i = 0; this happens for example if the support of σ 0 is P .) The above lemma yields the following theorem about θ 0 (G, P ) for a generic G. Proof. Let H 0 be the set of (σ 0 , v) such that (G, 0, σ 0 , v) in Θ(P ). H 0 is the set of solutions to a linear system of equations and inequalities obtained by eliminating the complementary slackness condition ψ ⊥ and insisting that λ be zero. There are now d T + N equations in this system which has d T + N + 1 variables. (Since λ = 0, it is not treated as a variable nor is ψ λ treated as an equation here.) By Lemma 5.1, points in H 0 satisfy at most one inequality of this system weakly; moreover, the set of points in H 0 that satisfy one inequality weakly is finite, while those that satisfy all them strictly has dimension at most one. Therefore, H 0 is either a singleton or an interval. We claim that H 0 cannot be a singleton. Indeed, suppose (σ 0 , v) belongs to H 0 . It satisfies at most one inequality ψ j with equality and it satisfies all the other inequalities strictly. As remarked above, there are d T + N equations in the system in d T + N + 1 variables; therefore, there is an interval of points around (σ 0 , v) that satisfy all equations and inequalities of the system other than possibly ψ j . The function ψ j is not uniformly zero on this interval, since H 0 contains only a finite number of points where this function is zero. Therefore, there exists a subinterval that has (σ 0 , v) as an endpoint that belongs to H 0 . Thus H 0 is not a singleton. In other words, H 0 when nonempty is an interval. In the interior of this interval all the inequalities are strict, while at the boundary points, exactly one of the inequalities is weak. Since θ 0 (P ) is the set of (0, σ 0 ) for which there exists a (unique) v such that (σ 0 , v) ∈ H 0 , the conclusion of the theorem follows.
For a game G, let θ 1 (G, P ) be the set of (λ, σ 0 ) such that the support of σ 0 is contained in P 1 and there exists v for which (G, λ, σ 0 , v) belongs to Θ(P ). As with θ 1 (G, P ), σ 0 is a pseudo-equilibrium of G ⊕ λg if (λ, σ 0 ) belongs to θ 1 (G, P ).
We now have an analog of Theorem 5.2, whose proof follows just like above. The only slightly different feature here is that we obtain a necessary condition for θ 1 (G, P ) to be nonempty, i.e. that P 1 is a maximal face of P . The reason for this is the following. Points in θ 1 (G, P ) assign zero probability to all vertices p l for l > l 1 . If l 1 < d T − 1 then every point in θ 1 (G, P ) satisfies at least two inequalities weakly, which by Lemma 5.1 is impossible. Let θ(G, P ) = θ 0 (G, P ) ∪ θ 1 (G, P ). The following theorem follows from our previous two theorems. 
The Path of the Algorithm
In this section we show that if the game G is generic then the union of the paths characterized in the previous Section 5 is a one-dimensional path, which then provides the basis for our algorithm.
Let G * be the union of the sets G\G P where P ranges over the principal simplices in P * , and the sets G P are as in Lemma 5.1. Then G * is a set of full measure; more precisely, its complement is a countable union of lower-dimensional semi-algebraic sets. For each G ∈ G * , let θ(G) be the union of the sets θ(G, P ).
Proof. Fix (λ, σ 0 ) in θ(G) and choose some T and P ∈ P(T ) such that (λ, σ 0 ) ∈ θ(G, P ). We show that (λ, σ 0 ) has a neighborhood in θ(G) that is piecewise-linearly homeomorphic to an interval. We do so for the case where (λ, σ 0 ) ∈ θ 0 (G, P ), i.e. λ = 0. (The arguments when λ > 0 are analogous and therefore omitted.)
Suppose σ 0 belongs to the interior of Σ 0 (P ). If (0, σ 0 ) does not belong to θ 0 (G, P ) for P = P then θ(G, P ) is the requisite neighborhood in θ(G). If (0, σ 0 ) belongs to some θ 0 (G, P ) then Σ 0 (P ) is a maximal proper face of Σ 0 (P ), i.e. P is a maximal proper face of P . There then exists i / ∈ I(T ) such that P = P ∨ i. Since (0, σ 0 ) belongs to θ 0 (G, P ), i is then a non-inferior reply against σ 0 in G. By Theorem 5.2 this strategy i, and hence also P , is unique; also, (0, σ 0 ) is a boundary point of θ 0 (G, P ). Since σ 0 belongs to a proper face of Σ 0 (P ), (0, σ 0 ) is also a boundary point of θ 0 (G, P ). As P belongs to P * , (0, σ 0 ) does not belong to θ 1 (G, P ) or θ 1 (G, P ). Therefore, by Theorem 5.4, (0, σ 0 ) is a boundary point of both θ(G, P ) and θ(G, P ). Then θ(G, P ) ∪ θ(G, P ) is the requisite neighborhood.
Suppose now that σ 0 belongs to the relative interior of a maximal proper face Σ 0 (Q) of Σ 0 (P ). If Q ∈ P * then applying the arguments of the previous paragraph to Q instead of P shows that θ(G, P ) ∪ θ(G, Q) is the requisite neighborhood. If Q / ∈ P * then either Q ∈ Q 1 or Q = P ∧ P for a unique P ∈ P(T ). If Q ∈ Q 1 then obviously (0, σ 0 ) / ∈ θ(G, P ) for P = P and θ(G, P ) is the requisite neighborhood. If Q = P ∧ P then (0, σ 0 ) is a boundary point of both θ 0 (G, P ) and θ 0 (G, P ). Moreover, since Q / ∈ Q 1 , it does not belong to θ 1 (G, P ) or θ 1 (G, P ). Hence θ(G, P ) ∪ θ(G, P ) is the requisite neighborhood.
Proof. Since P(σ 0 ) is a subset of the vertex set of a simplex in P * , for p, p ∈ P(σ 0 ), |p i −p i | 1 for all i ∈ I. Therefore, p−p √ I for such p and p . The result now follows from Theorem 3.3.
Our final theorem shows how to initialize the algorithm to compute equilibria with increasing accuracy. Suppose the vector g is such that for each n there exists a unique i ∈ S n such that g i > g j for all j = i in S n . Let s * ∈ S be the profile of these pure strategies.
where
Proof. The first statement follows from the fact that for sufficiently large λ, s * is an equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies in the game G ⊕ λg. As for the second statement, given ε > 0, choose an integer M > ε (x) and we are done.
Summary of the Algorithm
Given a generic game G ∈ G * and a generic array g of bonuses, after each iteration of the algorithm one obtains a pseudo-equilibrium σ 0 of G ⊕ λg for some λ 0. The support of the pseudo-equilibrium is the set of vertices of a principal simplex P of P * (T ) or P * 1 (T ) on the closed face of X with support T = n T n , where for each player n the set S n \ T n consists of those pure strategies i for which p i = 0 for all proposals in P . As proved in Theorem 4.6 and described in detail in Appendix A, the vertices p 
and the variables (x, y, λ) must be nonnegative. The associated complementarity conditions are:
As usual the solution of the linear equations is represented by a tableau of detached coefficients as in linear programming, and each iteration consists of pivoting (Gaussian elimination) in this tableau. Variables that are constrained to be zero are called non-basic, and others, basic. The payoffs v n are always basic after the initialization of the algorithm, as described below in Section 7.3. The algorithm alternates between a pivot in the tableau and a 'pivot' in the triangulation, where the latter operation obtains from P either an adjacent simplex, or a (d T − 1)-dimensional face of P , or a (d T + 1)-dimensional simplex of which P is a face. A pivot in the tableau identifies a variable that is newly non-basic, which initiates the 'pivot' in the triangulation that identifies the non-basic variable that is to be made basic in the next pivot in the tableau, from which one finds the newly non-basic variable that it replaces in the basis. To keep the tableau small, obsolete columns are deleted from the tableau as the algorithm progresses, and using the standard technique in linear programming, new ones are adjoined as they arise.
Here we describe the pivots in the tableau and refer to Appendix A for description of the 'pivots' in the triangulation. As in Appendix A, we use * to denote the operation that increments i * n (T ) for every n. (1) Suppose some x l was driven to zero, i.e. the pivot made x l nonbasic. There are three cases.
• The operations in Appendix A identify the principal simplex P of P * (T ) adjacent to P when vertex p l is deleted and a new vertex p is added. The column of x l is deleted from the tableau and replaced by the column of x l = σ 0 (p ). Then x l is increased to find the next variable that is driven to zero. Thus x l is the non-basic variable made basic in the next pivot.
• The operations in Appendix A find that when p l is deleted from P a lowerdimensional face in the boundary of P * (T ) is reached. This occurs when p l is the only vertex of P for which p l n,i > 0 for some n, i ∈ T n . Then i is deleted from T n , the column of x l is deleted from the tableau, and y n,i is increased to find the next variable that is driven to zero. Thus y n,i is the non-basic variable made basic in the next pivot.
• The operations in Appendix A find that when p l is deleted from P a face in P * 1 (T ) is reached. This happens only when λ = 0 and the * -increment becomes first in the ordering of increments defining P . Then the * -increment is deleted from the ordering 1 and λ is increased to find the next variable that is driven to zero. Thus λ is the non-basic variable made basic in the next pivot. (2) Suppose some y n,i was driven to zero, i.e. the pivot made y n,i nonbasic and thus strategy i of player n becomes an optimal reply. Then i is adjoined to T n and the operations in Appendix A identify the simplex P of which P is a face and the new vertex p that is added to P to obtain P . The column of x l = σ 0 (p ) is added to the tableau and then x l is increased to find the next variable that is driven to zero. Thus x l is the non-basic variable made basic in the next pivot. (3) Suppose λ was driven to zero, i.e. the pivot made λ nonbasic. This happens only when P is in the bottom face P * 1 (T ) of P * (T ). Then the operations in Appendix A identify the simplex P in P * (T ) of which P is a face and the new vertex p that is added to P to obtain P by appending the * -increment as last in the ordering. The column of x l = σ 0 (p ) is adjoined to the tableau and then x l is increased to find the next variable that is driven to zero. Thus x l is the non-basic variable made basic in the next pivot. 7.3. Initialization. The algorithm is initiated by starting with λ sufficiently large that there is a pseudo-equilibrium in which each player n uses the pure strategy i n = arg max i g n,i . Hence one starts with each T n = {i n } and P is the 0-dimensional simplex of P 1 consisting of the single vertex p 0 for which each p 0 n,in = α 1 . Reducing λ then establishes either that this remains an equilibrium as λ ↓ 0, or one reaches a first value λ * at which some y n,i , i = i n , is driven to zero as in case (2) x l + y 00 = 1, where initially d T = 0. Then one makes x 0 basic and y 00 non-basic, and for each n one makes v n basic and y n,i n nonbasic. Finally one makes λ basic and y n,i non-basic, thus entering into the iterative algorithm at step (2) described above.
Iterations of the algorithm then continue indefinitely. One can stop after any iteration for which λ = 0 and thereby obtain a pseudo-equilibrium that induces an ε-equilibrium of G, where ε depends on the current value of α as described in Theorems 3.3 and 6.2.
Concluding Remarks
This algorithm requires only minor modifications of the code published in [6, Appendix D] . The revised code is published in [8, Appendix B] . The computational times reported in [7] for a pre-specified scale factor α 1 remain roughly valid, but for large α 1 they are substantially improved by starting with a small value of α 1 and using the new algorithm presented here to reach larger values of the scale factor α, and hence greater precision. In test problems the typical pattern is that after the scale factor α becomes moderately large there is no change in the support of the players' strategies and the only effect of continuing the algorithm is to refine the precision. However, the number of iterations required to add each significant digit of accuracy typically grows exponentially because the size of the triangulation doesprogress is slow beyond four or five significant digits unless one compensates by incrementing α exponentially by ∆α > 1. At some point, therefore, for even greater precision it can be better to continue with the local Newton method (using the Jacobian of ψ for the equation system preceding Lemma 5.1), the method of iterated polymatrix approximation in [5] , or the continuous Global Newton Method in [1, 4] .
Appendix A. Principal Simplices of the Triangulation
This appendix describes the operations by which one moves among the principal simplices of the triangulation derived in Section 4.
A.1. Notation. Recall that each player n's set S n of pure strategies has a fixed order, i.e. S n is an ordered list. This order is inherited by the elements of each nonempty subset T n ⊂ S n . In the notation of Section 2.1 these elements are represented as i
For notational simplicity in this appendix we write this ordered list as i 1 
• n is the previous element (if any). A typical element of the list is denoted i j .
Recall that X = { ασ | α ∈ [α 1 , ∞), σ ∈ Σ } and its bottom face is Y = α 1 Σ, where α 1 is a positive integer, and P is the set of integer points in X. Section 4 describes the triangulation P of X with P as the vertices. For T = n T n , the triangulation P of X induces a triangulation P(T ) of the d T -dimensional closed face X(T ) with support T , and also a triangulation P 1 (T ) of the closed face Y (T ) of Y with support T . The collections of principal simplices of these triangulations are denoted by P * (T ) and P *
(T ).
To distinguish between the label of a pure strategy i j of player n, and the arithmetic operation of incrementing its value in a mixed strategy, we use the notation (n, i j ) to indicate the arithmetic operation in which the value of pure strategy i j ∈ T n , where i j < i * n , is incremented by 1 and the value of pure strategy i j+1 is decremented by 1. This operation is called the increment (n, i j ) even though it involves both an increment and a decrement. The set of these operations is denoted J(T ), where |J(T )| = d T − 1. We use * to denote the arithmetic operation in which, for each player n, the value of pure strategy i * n is incremented by a positive integer ∆α.
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Each of these operations has an inverse, i.e. the inverse of (n, i j ) decrements the value of i j by 1 and increments the value of i j+1 by 1, and the inverse of * decrements the value of every i * n by ∆α. We describe the principal simplices of P * (T ) and P * 1 (T ), and also the principal simplices that are one dimension higher than these and of which these are faces, and the principal simplices that are faces of these, one dimension lower, and that belong to the boundary of the face spanned by T . These are all the simplices encountered by the algorithm when the genericity condition in satisfied, i.e. G ∈ G * . where n's coordinate i j+1 is deleted from T n and the increment (n, i j+1 ) is deleted from the ordering.
• The * -increment appears immediately before the increment (n, i • When (n, i 1 ) is the last increment and the value of n's strategy i 1 is zero in the anchor: p 0 n,i 1 = 0. Deleting the last vertex yields a face. On this face, i 1 is deleted from T n and the increment (n, i 1 ) is deleted from the ordering.
• The * -increment appears last andp 0 = α 1 . In this case, one obtains a principal simplex of Q 1 (T ) by deleting the last vertex. One also deletes * from the ordering of increments.
These three operations thus determine all simplices adjacent to P on this face, as well as the maximal faces of P that lie on a face of T . From the restrictions above, it follows that these faces that lie on a face of T are obtained iff one of the following holds:
(1) The simplex P is in P * 1 (T ) and the first increment is (n, i
• n ) for some n. (2) In the ordering there are two successive increments of the form (n, i j ), (n, i j−1 ) and the increment (n, i j ) increases the value of strategy i j from 0 to 1, or there are two successive increments of the form * , (n, i
• n ) and the * -increment increases the value of strategy i * n from 0 to ∆α. (3) The last increment is (n, i 1 ) for some n and this increment moves the value of strategy i 1 from 0 to 1, or the last increment is * and it moves the sum of the coordinates from α 1 to α 1 + ∆α.
A.4. Principal Simplices of which P is a Face. Finally, one can adjoin a new strategy i ∈ S n \ T n to T n .
• If i < i 1 then append increment (n, i) by placing it last in the ordering.
• If i j < i < i j+1 for some j < i * n then insert increment (n, i) into the ordering immediately before the increment (n, i j ).
• If i > i * n then i becomes the new i * n and the old i * n becomes the new i
• n . The * -increment (if it is in the ordering) then increases the value of strategy i. However, if P is in P * 1 (T ) then create a new anchor by applying the inverse of the new increment (n, i
• n ) to the old anchor, and append the new increment (n, i
• n ) by placing it first in the ordering.
